

## **NS News Bulletin**

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## Hitler at War: What *Really* Happened?

by A.V. Schaerffenberg

Part 7

## Chapter 6: Campaign in Poland

"The truth is so fragile it needs a bodyguard of lies to protect it."

Winston S. Churchill

With the war against Poland all but won, "Hitler rose in the Reichstag to boast of his triumph over a defenseless people". This was how Walter Cronkite, a mouth-piece for conventional historians and anti-Nazi propagandists, depicted the Poles of 1939. His portrayal has since become historical dogma, wherein Poland is still depicted as a peace-loving country too timid and small to defend itself from Hitler's bullying. But as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Poles outraged British and French allies with their stubborn refusal to peacefully negotiate. And they were by no stretch of the imagination "a defenseless people".

Since modern Poland had been created in the aftermath of World War One, Mar-

shall Jozef Pilsudski pushed forward extensive armament programs to match his aggressive foreign policies. He was known as a bellicose troublemaker throughout eastern Europe, and engaged in skirmishes with all his neighbors, including the Germans of Silesia, who were in fact "a defenseless people" during the early 1920's when he occupied their land in flagrant violation of international law. Even the Allied framers of the Versailles Treaty excoriated the Poles for their cowardly victimization of disarmed Germans.

Pilsudski simultaneously staged a full-blown attack on the USSR. Although it failed, he prevented the Soviets from counter-invading Poland. The day National Socialism was elected to power in Germany, Pilsudski, without provocation, dispatched a secret emissary to Paris where a joint invasion of the Reich was proposed. The ill-prepared French were horrified, and declined to consider his criminal suggestion of waging undeclared war on a nation too weak to have threatened anyone, let alone the bellicose Poles. Pilsudski was married to a Jewess, which accounted for his personal animosity toward Germans in general and National Socialism in particular.

As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the Polish government signed a friend-ship treaty with the Reich in January, 1934. At the same time, Pilsudski dispatched his ambassador, Millstein, to Lithuania in a covert effort at luring the leadership of that Baltic nation into a joint military alliance against Germany. Millstein, a son-in -law of the international banking House of Rothschild in Paris, was coolly received by the Lithuanians, whose old capital, Vilnius, had been seized and was still held by the double-dealing Marshall.

After his death from cancer or poison in 1935, Polish arms manufacturing continued unabated, but some Warsaw officials began to grasp the suicidal folly of simultaneously opposing both Stalin and Hitler, and leaned toward *rapprochement* with the New Germany. Slowly, the two countries were drifting together until Bullitt's siren-song of easy conquest lulled the Poles to their doom. By August, 1939, popular agitation against Hitler inside Poland reached fever-pitch, resulting in unrestrained mob actions directed at the country's 1.5 million Germans. How many of them were dragged from their homes and beaten or stoned to death by the incensed rabble have never been precisely ascertained, although International Red Cross estimates put the figure in excess of 3,000 men, women and children over a twenty-year period beginning in 1919. Some 500 German nationals were murdered by the incensed Poles during 1939 alone. Swiss records documenting Polish atrocities against the German minority, although available to public inspection for more than 60 years, are a neglected factor in Polish-German relations prior to World War Two.

While British military strategists were conferring in London with their Polish

pawns, Poland's leading newspaper, *Kurier Polski*, published banner-headlines demanding, "Germany must be destroyed!" (*Goebbels*, p.304). Hysterical conditions during late summer 1939 were described by a German u-boat captain, Werner Hartmann. "For weeks, there had been unrest in Poland," he remembered. "The newspapers and cabarets mocked the German people. German citizens were, without grounds, accused and arrested. Ethnic Germans were lynched. General Ironside (British Chief of the Imperial General Staff) inspected the Polish Army. Megalomanical balloon-cap military men talked about the Battle of Tempelhof (i.e., Berlin) and 'the border' on the Elbe. Danzig was systematically cut off, and Gdingen --- a schizophrenic formation made of half-finished, concrete blocks, and wooden fences along the sea --- was supposed to become the great port of Eastern Europe. Each day, the newspaper headlines reported new and more worrisome excesses of this escalating chauvinism. One time, they claimed a Polish fleet would prepare a Salamis in the Baltic for us, and the waves would turn red with our blood all the way to the white chalk cliffs of Ruegen" (33).

Still, Hitler had no intention of playing into his enemies' hands by starting a war, whose outcome no one could guess. Frustrated by his iron self-control, the Warsaw authorities insanely ordered Polish special forces to attack the small German border town of Gleiwitz, which they actually occupied on 31 August 1939. Altogether, the Poles launched approximately 35 sorties across the eastern borders of the Third Reich, attacks which are never mentioned by court historians intent on depicting Hitler as the sole aggressor. Even now, he sought a negotiated end to the fighting. As writers for the anti-Nazi *Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War Two* were forced to admit, "The German invasion of Poland was launched after the Polish Ambassador in Berlin refused to see Hitler's proposals for a peaceful solution to the problem of Danzig and the Corridor" (22). With his country under attack, the Fuehrer was left no other option but to order countermeasures. Accordingly, on the morning of 1 September, the Poles got what they desired, when the Blitzkrieg fell on them like the wrath of God.

Just then, the Duce demonstrated his resolve for peace by requesting a five-power conference in Paris on 5 September "to examine the clauses in the Treaty of Versailles, which are at the root of the trouble". Hitler agreed, and told the British and French that he would halt his attack and withdraw from Poland, if only he were allowed to keep the German city of Danzig---German. To this imminently reasonable request, the Western democracies preferred war with all of its mutually catastrophic consequences.

Poland had been arming for twenty years. And a glimpse at her military is sufficient to show that the Poles were hardly "defenseless". They mobilized a millionman army in thirty modern-equipped infantry divisions backed up by a "National

Defense" of 100,000 reservists. *The Cavendish Encyclopedia* describes Poland's army as "one of the largest in the world" (22). Polish infantry were supported by an armored brigade of no less than 300 tanks, which puts to lie the Allied myth of Poland's operatic cavalry as its only means of defense. The Poles did operate horse-regiments (37 in all), but so did every other modern nation in the world-including Germany and the U.S.; cavalry units were still an integral part of contemporary warfare.

Unknown to most students of World War Two, the Poles operated a modern navy of five submarines, four destroyers, six mine-sweepers and a mine-layer. While these forces seem meager compared to those of other navies, they were suitable for the confines of the Baltic, and certainly more up-to-date than their lumbering adversary, the antiquated *Schleswig-Holstein*, which fired the first German shots of the Second World War. Warsaw's naval forces continued to fight long after the capital fell in October, 1939. Half-a-year later, for example, on 8 April 1940, the German transport, *Rio de Janeiro*, was sunk in the Baltic by a Polish submarine, the *Orzel*.

The Poles had an air-fleet of nearly a thousand aircraft. The advanced P.37 "Elk" medium-bomber flew 40 miles per hour faster than Germany's top medium bomber, the Heinkel He 111H-16, even though both aircraft carried equivalent pay-loads of 5,600 pounds of bombs each. The PZL P.23 single-engine bomber was the most numerous type of aircraft in service with the Polish Air Force at the beginning of the war, 114 examples serving in first-line units, with additional 11 received as replacements. Able to operate from improvised airfields, the rugged *Karas*, or "Carp", carried a 1,330-pound bomb-load at 186 m.p.h., and was armed at both dorsal and ventral gunner positions, making it better defended than German counterparts, the twin-engine Messerschmitt-110 or *Stuka* dive-bomber.

But the premiere fighter of the Polish Air Force was the nimble PZL P.11, a high-wing monoplane produced by Warsaw's *Panstwowe Zaklady Lotnicze*, the National Aviation Plants. Although slower than most of its Luftwaffe opponents, the P.11 was quick and highly maneuverable. In the hands of a skilled airman (and many Polish flyers were superb aviators), the P.11 was a formidable opponent. Most histories of World War Two fail to mention that the first aerial victory of the Polish Campaign was scored by a single P.11 pilot over two Dornier medium bombers. And 285 Luftwaffe aircraft lost during the brief campaign testified to the fighting abilities of the Polish Air Force.

While the Messerschmitt Me 109E was superior to the Polish warplane (as it was to every other fighter in the world at the time), the P.11 was on a par with and even superior to pursuit models flown by contemporary air forces around the world. The P.11 was as good as, if not better a performer than Russia's Polikarpov bi-

planes, Italy's CR-42, the RAF's Gloster *Gladiator*, Japan's Mitsubishi A5M (U.S. code-name, *Claude*), or the American Brewster *Buffalo*---all front-line warplanes in 1939. Far from being "largely obsolete", Polish aircraft were standard or better for their time, and sometimes, as in the *Elk*'s case, state-of-the-art machines.

Mainstream accounts of World War Two invariably portray opponents defeated by National Socialists as weak or defenseless in order to sustain the propaganda image of Hitler's followers as bullies who could never win a fair fight. Their intentions are obvious and extra-historical. The tens of thousands of Wehrmacht dead, missing and wounded in less than one month of combat are proof that the Germans did not merely stroll across Poland to an easy victory. To denigrate Polish resistance as "futile" or "pathetic" is to demean the ground troops, sailors and airmen who fought so skillfully and bravely for their country, betrayed as they were by the Western Allies and their own leaders. As Adolf Hitler himself publicly admitted in Danzig after the campaign: "At this point, let us do full justice to the Polish soldiers. The Poles have fought bravely in many places. Their non-commissioned officers did their utmost. Their officers lacked intelligence. Their supreme command was an absolute failure. Their organization was just Polish."

No better example of the truth of his assessment can be found outside the Poles' defense of the Westerplatte fronting the port of Danzig. Since 1924, they had been secretly building the peninsula into a major military transit facility against the pledged assurances of Warsaw politicians with League of Nations negotiators trying to pacify the potential flash-point between Germany and Poland. According to Polish historian, Maciej Jonasz, "It should be noted the locations of the basement positions (of the armed citadel) had to be kept hidden, since their existence was prohibited by the terms of the accord that regulated the existence of the facility. They were even kept secret from the junior enlisted personnel of the guard, which was rotated every six months. Only the officers and senior NCOs knew about the underground fighting positions ... " (66). This veil of strict secrecy concealed a concrete-reinforced, state-of-the-art, armed installation of numerous machine-gun posts, mortars, and artillery manned by a company of elite troops. The existence of such a clandestine, even illegal fortification *fifteen years* prior to the outbreak of World War Two revealed Polish preparations for conflict with Germany, and long before Hitler, who is still blamed for provoking hostilities with Poland, assumed office.

On 1 September, oblivious to the extent of its defenses, the Germans launched a frontal attack on the Westerplatte, and were gunned down before getting anywhere near the concealed citadel, their armored assault shattered by the Poles' 75-mm field gun. Coming to the rescue was that elderly warship from the by-gone era of the dreadnought, the *Schleswig-Holstein*, of 1909 vintage. Jonasz writes that the

Polish field artillery "was spotted by the battleship's look-outs, and heavy fire was immediately directed against it. The first naval round hit the trunk of the tree under which the 75-mm was located, and the next two came close enough to put the piece entirely out of action. (The gun was later repaired and used by the Germans, finally ending its career in the Stalingrad pocket)" (68, 69).

The doughty, old war-horse carried the day, lobbing an increasing number of direct hits into the installation. "That brutal barrage, during which the battleship fired its huge guns into the facility from only 400 meters' range, was kept up until 9:00 pm. It led the Poles to evacuate Strong-point Prom, whose personnel pulled back to help man Guardhouse One. Warrant Officer Gryczman testified as to the intensity of the fire when he gave the order to pull out: 'I've survived two wars, but I've never seen anything like this!""

Polish Westerplatte held out for a week against the Germans, who could be chivalrous to a determined foe. "After the surrender," Jonasz reported (71), "the Polish officers were allowed to keep their sabers as a sign of respect the defense had earned among their opponents." The Poles suffered 15 fatalities, while 200 to 300 of their opponents lay dead.

Against Poland's 30 divisions, one armored brigade and 842 operational aircraft, Germany fielded 106 divisions, six armored divisions, and 3,000 warplanes. The comparison is misleading, however, because more than half of these Wehrmacht forces had to be ready at a moment's notice to engage anticipated attacks by Britain and France in the west. While the Germans possessed numerical and technological superiority over the Poles, their edge was not as pronounced as it appeared on paper.

Polish leaders were never under any illusions that they could win alone against Hitler. Their strategy of delaying the German advance until the Western Allies came to their rescue was, of course, based entirely on British and French promises. General Tadeusz Kutrzeba, the director of the Polish Military Academy, famous during the Campaign as commander of the Bruza River counter-offensive, knew that "it will be necessary to wait for help from France. Poland will have to rely on her own forces for six to eight weeks, even if the French react promptly". But the Fuehrer had no intention of allowing them that much time. The French Commander-in-Chief, General Gamelin, said, "I know the Polish Army perfectly. Its troops are excellent and its commanders beyond praise. The Poles will hold out, and we will lose no time in coming to their aid. The Poles will hold out for at least six months, and we will come to their aid via Rumania."

But such thinking was rooted in the out-dated strategies of World War One. Allied commanders presumed they needed at least three weeks to ready their forces, by which time the Germans had already brought the war in Poland to a close.

Shocked by the Wehrmacht's rapid advance, the French tried to mount operations against western Germany's defenses between the Rhine and Moselle rivers. But fraught with the committee irresponsibility and endemic corruption of democracies everywhere, France took a week to organize her attack.

By that time, it was prematurely launched and less than half-hearted. With the Germans driving into Poland much faster and deeper than Allied commanders dreamed possible, General Gaston Pretelat, director of the offensive, came under severe political pressure to attack western Germany at once, ready or not. He hastily assembled 31 divisions, including 14 first-line units, of the French 2nd Army Group. Despite this formidable force at his command, Pretelat moved forward with temerity against the overwhelmingly out-numbered German 1st Army of barely 17 divisions. To their dismay, the French found the Siegfried Line protecting the German frontier was too far behind the front, forcing their artillery to place itself under enemy fire before they could engage the defenses. Moreover, the Siegfried Line proved impregnable to 155-mm shells. Even after the French brought up their 220-mm and 280-mm guns---the largest ordinance on Earth---the Siegfried Line's defenses of re-enforced concrete stood unscathed, although Pretelat's gunnery was fast and highly accurate. The Siegfried Line held out, giving new meaning to the term, "German steel".

Meanwhile, General Edouard Requin's 4th Army, with its left flank on the Saar, captured 7.5 miles of German territory. At the same time, General Conde's 3rd Army took over a salient of the Warndt Forest. From these positions, Pretelat prepared for a direct assault on the Siegfried Line to open on 17 September. But by then, Warsaw was besieged and the Polish armies routed. Further operations seemed pointless, so they were called off. Ironically, the projected date of Pretelat's offensive was the same day Russian troops entered eastern Poland, an event that was supposed to have been coordinated with France to squeeze Germany in between. But at least the French attempted to fulfill their part of the bargain, however half-heartedly. The British, from whom the Poles had received all manner of firm assurances for military aid, never lifted a finger to help them. The English had neither means nor any intention to save Poland, over which they were now eager to fight a war against Germany, whatever the pretext.

What really defeated the Poles and simultaneously halted any offensives by the Western Allies was the close cooperation between rapidly advancing motorized armor and the Luftwaffe. Such novel coordination depended on local air commanders working in concert with officers on the ground. This unique, highly effective inter-service combination was unknown in the class-conscious structure of non-National Socialist military circles. It resulted from the spirit of class collaboration with which Adolf Hitler had inspired his people. The Junker Ju 87 Stukas

served as flying artillery, blasting holes in enemy positions through which the Panzers poured in great numbers.

This unprecedented tactical use of aircraft and tanks was envisioned by Luftwaffe Chief Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering, as the best means of knocking out Poland before the French had time to organize a serious threat against weak defenses in western Germany. Accordingly, German air divisions punched huge gaps in Poland's fortifications along the border. Through these the invasion vanguard of Army Group South stormed on the morning of 1 September. Junker, Heinkel, and Dornier bombers continued to sever the life-lines of enemy forces on the ground, especially all roads and railways carrying Polish reinforcements and supplies to the front. They isolated battlefield after battlefield, thereby crippling communications and transportation, and preventing massed counter-attacks against the Panzers.

A vital objective of this first *Blitzkrieg*, or "lightning war", was the immediate destruction of the dangerous Polish Air force on the ground. But the Luftwaffe caught and destroyed only 30 enemy aircraft still parked near and in their hangars. The Poles had wisely spread their warplanes all across the country at numerous airfields. Consequently, their Air Force had to be destroyed in aerial combat. And it was. P-23s saw extensive action in the first two weeks of the Campaign, attacking German motorized and Panzer columns. But Messerschmitt pilots decimated the dive-bombers before most of them could approach their targets. The eminent *Karas* units suffered more than 85% casualties, leaving just 17 "Carps" to straggle across the border into Rumania, where they were ignominiously impounded.

But the Poles fought on with valiant determination. On 7 September, the Polish Air Force scored its greatest single aerial victory by bringing down 15 German planes in one engagement. Warsaw operated a state-of-the-art early-warning system that caught Luftwaffe airmen by surprise. Whenever they arrived at the Polish capital, swarms of P.11 fighters were already waiting for them. According to Polish Air Force Major F. Kalinowski, "a net of observation posts to provide early warning of approaching enemy aircraft had been established around Warsaw in the summer of 1939, and these posts were to pass information by radio and telephone to the Pursuit Brigade's operations room, from which all scramble orders were given".

As the Luftwaffe pilots battled for control of the sky, they were distracted from their chief purpose: supporting their comrades-in-arms on the ground. Consequently, from 15 to 18 September, the Polish 11th and 38th Divisions of the "Sosnkowski Group" smashed through three attempted encirclements undertaken by the German 14th Army. Marching all night and fighting by day, the Poles defeated all Wehrmacht efforts to prevent them from crossing the strategic San Riv-

er. They captured in the process 20 artillery pieces and 180 vehicles from the Germans. Earlier, tanks of the 4th Panzer Division were beaten back in their failed surprise attack on Warsaw. As the 35th Panzer and 12th Rifle Regiments advanced through the capital's suburbs, they came under intense fire from artillery actually directed from the city itself. Suffering heavy casualties, they were forced to withdraw. But not far behind them stormed the mighty 10th Army. It ran up to the Vistula at Gora Kalwaria, where it absolutely decimated the elite Lotz Army.

Horrified by the rapid annihilation of his premiere fighting force, Marshal Rydz-Smigly, Poland's commander-in-chief, ordered a general, delaying retreat to the east. The powerful Pomorze and Poznan Armies, comprising four infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades---an entire army group---led this fighting withdrawal toward Warsaw. They took up positions near Kutno, near the Bzura River, about 65 miles west of the capital, under the command of General Kutrzeba. On 10 September, while attempting to cross the river, the Poles were challenged by the numerically inferior German 10th Army, which had rushed up from Lodz to bar their passage.

Seizing the initiative to launch their own counter-offensive, the Poles went over on the attack with furious determination, capturing bridge-heads near Lowicz, and pushing back the German 30th Infantry Division. The 10th Army was cut off from its supplies, and the entire flank of the Wehrmacht's Army Group South was suddenly threatened. A terrible upset was imminent, and the entire Campaign thrown into jeopardy, when the Luftwaffe flew to the rescue. Flying eight or more missions per day, Henschel 123 attack-planes and Stuka dive-bombers pulverized the enemy-held bridge-heads, paralyzing Polish defensive positions around Dzialoszyn and Czestochowa. Twin-engined Messerschmitt Me-110s strafed large concentrations of General Kutrzeba's best troops, which were further decimated by level sorties undertaken by Dornier and Heinkel medium-bombers. The Poles and their horses went mad with panic amidst the prolonged deluge of falling bombs and shells.

It was now possible for the German 8th Army to link up with the besieged 10th, and further air strikes enabled its motorized and Panzer divisions to thrust northward, spearing the combined Pomorze and Poznan Armies in flank. Like painfully wounded serpents, they lashed out at the Germans around Lowicz and Sochaczew, where incredibly vicious hand-to-hand fighting raged back and forth, until the Poles were gradually hemmed in and cut off at Kutno. A week of intense, division-scale combat ended on 10 September with the surrender of 170,000 Polish soldiers.

Instantly following up on their success, Luftwaffe bombers pounced on the Polish 7th Division still holding out at Czestochowa. A full day of non-stop straf-

ing and bombing by Luftflotte 4 forced the entire division to surrender *en masse*, the first time that an air force had compelled ground units of such size to lay down their arms. Just five days later, the pilots of Luftflotte 4 repeated their historymaking victory, when they forced the surrender of an even greater number of enemy troops south of Radom, where the Poles were surrounded by an iron ring of Panzers.

The Battle of the Bzura had come to an end, but not Rydz-Smigly's hopes for making possible French attacks against western Germany by holding up the Wehrmacht's advance. In fact, General Pretelat's men had already begun their assault on the Siegfried Line. French intervention was indeed beginning to have its effect on the Polish Campaign, as Goering suddenly withdrew another 400 medium-bombers to the Western Front, just as air operations over Warsaw were about to get under way against its resolute defenders playing for time. Lumbering transports, the venerable Junkers Ju-52s, were pressed into emergency service as bombers, a role for which they were completely unsuited. Just thirty "Auntie Jus" were packed with crates of two-pound phosphorus incendiary bombs. These were literally man-handled out the cargo bay doors by two soldiers assigned to each Junkers!

To end the Polish Campaign as quickly as possible, Hitler intervened in the fighting for the first time. Until now, he had given his generals a free hand in their conduct of the war. But they were not moving quickly enough. The Fuehrer had wanted to knock out Poland in three weeks, sufficient time for him to ready his defenses against the Allies' anticipated attack from the west, which had, in fact, already begun. To scoop up the rest of Polish forces east of the Vistula, he ordered the 14th Army to swing north-east from L'vov. Its XIX Panzer Corps sprang the trap, and the campaign was a good as over. Now Warsaw was completely surrounded. With all of Poland's armed forces either destroyed or routed, defense of the capital was senseless. The Germans ordered its defenders to peaceably surrender, thereby avoiding unnecessary bloodshed. The Poles still trusted in their salvation from the Western Allies, however, and refused. In response, Goering concentrated 1,776 bombing sorties in just 48 hours, forcing Warsaw to capitulate on 27 September. Its defenders were not abused, but accorded the honors of war by General Blaskowitz, commander of the German 8th Army, a gesture that handsomely reflected upon his and the Wehrmacht's sense of chivalry and humanity, qualities later shown to be mostly missing from the Allies.

The Campaign had been brief, but brutal, with 10,572 German fatalities, 3,400 missing (presumed dead), and 30,322 wounded. More than 694,000 Poles were taken prisoner. Prior to the surrender at Warsaw, Rydz-Smigly, Beck and all the others whose arrogance, and greed had brought it about left the Polish people in

the midst of their misery by fleeing to Rumania. It was from here that General Gamelin's pledged French troops were supposed to have saved Poland in time. But all the Polish conspirators found in Rumania was internment. Other Poles fled to England, the very nation that had betrayed their country, to carry on a brainless, self-defeating fight against Hitler. As it turned out, these matchless fools lived to see the day when the Soviet ally of their duplicitous British comrades was exposed for the execution of some 15,000 Poles in the Katyn Woods massacre during April, 1943.

When the pro-Allied head of Poland's government in exile, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, demanded the atrocity be investigated, the British Secret Service assassinated him three months later in a rigged air crash at Gibraltar, for fear he would alienate Stalin at a time when Britain needed Soviet participation. Brushing aside the mass-murder of their Polish allies, who had earlier won them so much propaganda value, Churchill and Roosevelt utterly dispensed with them at the notorious Teheran Conference when they handed over Poland in its entirety to the Soviet demons.

By contrast, Hitler wanted to preserve an independent Polish state, but had been prevented from doing so by Stalin, who demanded the partition of Poland as the price for his non-belligerence (*Cavendish*, 37). The Soviets were certainly not entitled to any special considerations, since they just marginally kept up their part of the Non-Aggression Pact by invading Poland *after* the campaign had already been decided on 17 September. They were afraid of the Poles, who had almost toppled their Communist empire less than twenty years before, when Marshall Pilsudski's armies had invaded the USSR. Hence, their cowardly revenge on this defeated people.

Polish betrayal seemed to feed upon itself. In August, 1944, at the urging of a Soviet radio broadcast promising massive Russian support, the Poles staged an armed uprising against the German occupation authorities. The Waffen-SS responded by reducing the Polish capital to smoking ruins in attacks far more devastating than the 1939 Luftwaffe air offensive. As the Poles fought yet another harebrained, fore-doomed battle with the Germans, they could see Red Army troops poised as though ready to help at the eastern outskirts of Warsaw. But Stalin ordered his forces to stand down and let the Poles "stew in their own juices". When the British requested permission to at least air-drop supplies into Warsaw, he refused. Soon thereafter, the up-rising was defeated with heavy loss of life. Yet again, the Poles had allowed themselves to be duped by the transparent promises of foreigners who regarded their country as nothing more than the pawn of alien goals.

All this and more the Poles suffered for their refusal to consider Adolf Hitler's

rational request: the return of a single city which did not belong to them. How miniscule, even petty that negotiable issue seems, compared to the vast panorama of destruction, death and suffering that followed for Poland and the rest of the world!

Without doubt, no other nation on Earth could have defeated Poland's million-man armed forces in less than a month. Allied plans to delay the German advance, thereby allowing sufficient time for France to attack in the west, were sound by the strategic standards of the day. No one, not even Hitler's own generals, believed the Poles could be overcome in little more than three weeks. As such, he deserves most of the credit for the victory, primarily through his insistence on ground-supporting air-power, and his huge encirclement of enemy forces east of the Vistula, where the Poles lost all hopes for prolonged resistance.

The Campaign was indeed a triumph of National Socialist genius and courage over small-minded conspirators attempting to crush the greatest hope of the White Race. But it was also catastrophic for a valuable people betrayed by avaricious politicians and foreigners with extra-Polish agendas. Worse still, 1939's mutual slaughter of Aryan men in Poland was a tragedy for Western Civilization, where its Great Fratricidal War and the real Decline of the West began.







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